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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction over this Appeal is pursuant to Rules 3 and 4,
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court

and

78-2-2 (3 )(j) , Utah Code

Annotated.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

This

is an Appeal

from

a Summary

Judgment

in favor

of

Plaint i ff /Respondent, City Consumer Services, Inc., granted by
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby, Second Judicial District Court, Davis
County, State of Utah, dated November 18, 1988 (R. 94-96).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
Whether granting Respondent's Motion

for Summary

Judgment

was error in that genuine issues of material fact existed to be
determined.
Did the lower Court, in view of the facts and circumstances
of this case, improperly conclude that the Utah "One-Action Rule"
(78-37-1 U.C.A.)

did not apply to this case on the basis that

Respondent unilaterally determined
expedient
sufficient

to

foreclose

value

in

the

its

it would not be

Trust

subject

Deed

financially

although

property

at

there

the

time

was
of

foreclosure of the senior lien to satisfy the obligation owing to
Respondent by Appellant?
Is Respondent barred by both the "One-Action Rule" and

57-1-32

U.C.A.

from pursuing

its claimed

deficiency

against

Appellant?
Did

the lower Court follow existing case law and the Utah

Rules of Procedure

in awarding

attorney's

fees and

costs

to

Respondent?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated, Title 78-37-1, as amended.
Utah Code Annotated, Title 57-1-32, as amended.
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 54(d)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant, Vera Hess Peters, was the owner of real property
(condominium)

located

at

1245

East

Siesta

Drive, Salt

County, Utah, which was subject to an obligation
Note) owing

to Prudential

$54,420.00.

Appellant

Federal

applied

for

Savings
and

Lake

(Trust Deed and

in the

obtained

amount

a loan

of

from

Respondent, City Consumer Services, Inc., on or about April 30,
1981 for the principal sum of $19,500.00, evidenced
sued on by Respondent

by a Note

(R. 6) secured by a Second Trust Deed of

even date on the subject real property, recorded May 5, 1981.
(R. 27, para. 4; R. 44-47)
Appellant sold her interest in the subject real property on
or about May 6, 1981, by Uniform Real Estate Contract which was

recorded at the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder as Entry
No. 3672262.

(See Appendix A)

The purchaser under the Uniform

Real Estate Contract assumed, as part of the purchase price of
$84,500.00, the First Trust Deed obligation to Prudential Federal
Savings

($54,353.70) and

Respondent

($18,761.00).

the Second

Trust

(See Appendix A)

Deed obligation to
Respondent

claims

notice of this sale was given to Appellant (R. 20-21, para. 9;
R. 35, para. 2)
Respondent, prior to granting the loan to Appellant, had the
subject real property appraised, which

established

its market

value at $92,500.00 on April 25, 1981. (R. 48-50)
with actual knowledge of the senior

Respondent,

lien obligation

owing

to

Prudential Federal Savings, made the loan to Appellant based on
this appraisal, determining that the combined obligations equaled
eight

(80%)

percent

of the appraised

value

of

the

subject

property. (R. 50)
Payments were made on both Trust Deeds until approximately
October, 1986, a period of more
para. 7; R. 2 7 , para. 6)
$17,599.30.
purchaser

five

(5) years.

(R. 20,

Payments made to Respondent totaled

(R. 35, para. 3)

from Appellant

than

A default

occurred

when

the

discontinued making payments and the

senior lien holder, Prudential, commenced

foreclosure

of

its

senior Trust Deed to a Trustee's Sale on or about June 22, 1987.
(R. 21, para. 11; R. 27, para. 5) Respondent took no action to
protect its security

interest

in the subject property or pursue

foreclosure of its Trust Deed because, "it did not believe there
was

an economic

Respondent's
January

justification

second

to do

appraisal

18, 1987 established

so."

(R. 21, para.

of the subject
a market

property

value

for

the

12)

dated

subject

property of $70,250.00 at the time of foreclosure and sale by the
senior lien holder, Prudential.
was approximately $50,000.00.

The amount owing to Prudential
Based on the market value of the

January, 1987 appraisal (R. 51-53), there was additional value of
$20,000.00

in the subject property

to satisfy the obligation

owing to Respondent of $17,082.42 as of July

15, 1988

(R. 21,

para. 12; R. 28, para. 9)
Plaintiff commenced its action on the Note October 21, 1987,
for $17,082.42 due with interest.

(R. 1-5)

After discovery,

(R. 13-18) Respondent filed its Motion for Summary Judgment with
supporting Memorandum and Affidavit.
her Memorandum

(R. 19-31)

Appellant filed

in Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary

Judgment and Motion to Dismiss with attached exhibits in that the
action of Plaintiff, in substance, sought a deficiency
without compliance with 78-37-1 U.C.A.
Action Rule."
Motion

(1953 amended) "The One-

(R. 34-53) Respondent then delayed hearing on its

for Summary

Judgment

Appellant's Memorandum.

until

filing

of

its

(Rtt 54-55; R. 62-68)

Summary Judgment was heard September

for Summary

Judgment

on

27, 1988.

the basis,

response

to

The Motion for

Court, by ruling dated September 29, 1988, granted
Motion

judgment

(1)

The

District

Respondent's
Appellant's

pleadings
i s s u e of
not
sale

and Memorandum was " i n s u f f i c i e n t
fact;"

(2) That t h e One-Action Rule

applicable
of

the

this

subject

Prudential,
Plaintiff

to

there

in

property

was

(Respondent)

procedure.

case

no

that
by

after

to

show t h e r e

is

an

( 7 8 - 3 1 - 1 U.C.A.)

is

the

foreclosure

the

senior

to

foreclose

property

i s not r e q u i r e d

lien
on;

t o go t h r o u g h a

and

holder,
(3)

The

fruitless

(R. 79)

Respondent filed its Motion for Determination of Attorney's
Fees based on Affidavit which was heard by the District Court,
November 1, 1988.

(R. 82-92)

After objection to the sufficiency

of the Affidavit and failure to file the proper Memorandum of
Costs, the Court allowed counsel for Respondent to testify.
(T.9;R.93)

The lower Court awarded attorney's fees at the rate

of $100.00 per hour, with fees for paralegal and an associate.
(T. 10-11)

The award

of

attorney's

fees

and

costs

was

incorporated by Respondent in the Summary Judgment, November 18,
1988. (R. 94-96)

Notice of Appeal was timely filed December 5,

1988. (R. 98-99)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION
FOR

SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

RAISED

ISSUES

OF FACT

THAT

COULD NOT

PROPERLY BE DISPOSED OF THROUGH SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The action

brought

by Respondent

against

Appellant, in

substance, seeks a deficiency judgment without foreclosure of its

Second

Trust Deed

in compliance

(1953 amended), commonly referred

with

Section 78-37-1, U.C.A.

to as the "One-Action

Rule."

The case of First Security Bank of Utah v. Felger, 658 Fed. Supp.
175, 181

(D. Ut. 1987) established

Rule" applies

that

the Utah

"One-Action

to Trust Deeds as well as mortgages.

(See also

Utah Mortgage & Loan Company v. Black, 618 P.2d 43, (Ut. 1980);
Lockhart Company v. Equitable Realty Company, 658 P.2d 1333 (Ut.
1983)

Title 78-37-1 provides:
There can be one action for recovery of any debt or
enforcement of any rights secured solely by mortgage
upon real estate, which action must be in accordance
with the provisions of this chapter.

It is undisputed

that Respondent did not foreclosure its Trust

Deed and exhaust the security
Appellant.

Respondent,

before bringing
in

attempting

action
to

against

escape

its

responsibility, claimed it came within the exception to the "OneAction

Rule" where

the security was allegedly lost through no

fault of its own. (R. 29-30;T.4-6)
case and

The undisputed

facts of this

law clearly do not support Respondent's claim that it

comes within the exception to the "One-Action Rule" which

is a

material issue of fact to be determined by evidence as opposed to
Summary Judgment.
The market value of the subject property, at the time of the
foreclosure

and

sale by

the

senior

lien holder, Prudential,

established by appraisal obtained by Respondent January 18, 1987,
was $70,250.00

(R. 51-53)

The subject property had a value over

and above the senior lien to Prudential of $20,000.00, more than

enough to satisfy the remaining obligation owing to Respondent by
Appellant.
there

(R. 21; R. 28)

is no personal

Under the cited section and 78-37-2,

liability on the part of Appellant, as a

mortgagor, until after a foreclosure sale of the security, and
then only for the deficiency remaining unpaid.
v. Davis, 581, P.2d

1001

(Ut. 1978); First

Boley, 90 Ut. 341, 61 P.2d 621 (1936)

Bank of Ephraim
National Bank v.

The Supreme Court of Utah,

in the case of Lockhart Company v. Equitable Realty, Inc., 657
P.2d 1333 (Ut. 1983) said:
The security must be, in fact, exhausted and a
deficiency established to a certainty in order to
permit a junior mortgagee to bring an action on the
note without first exhausting the security;
A material

issue of fact existed at the time of hearing of the

Motion for Summary Judgment

with

regard

to the value of

the

security interest of Respondent and whether or not Respondent had
in fact met its responsibility by law in exhausting the security
before bringing

its action for deficiency.

The facts in this

case clearly establish that the subject property had value over
and above the senior lien obligation at the time of foreclosure
and sale.

Thus, a critical

issue of

fact

to the entire

case

precluding granting a Summary Judgment, is whether Respondent's
failure to protect its security interest, and not preventing the
foreclosure by the senior lien holder with resulting loss of the
value of its security constitutes "fault" barring Respondent from
seeking a deficiency judgment.

Respondent, totally aware of the

foreclosure action by the senior

lien holder, had

the

subject

property appraised, and established that its security had value.
(R. 51-53; T. 3-6)

Respondent took no action to cure the senior

lien default or bid at the foreclosure sale in that it did not
believe there was economic justification for doing so.
12;

T. 3-6)

(R. para.

This statement by Respondent, and the additional

conclusory statement contained in its responsive Memorandum, not
supported by Affidavit, to-wit:
(c) The junior lien holder would have to advance
its own funds to pay off the debt owing to the
senior lien holder. It would thereby tie up funds
which could otherwise be lent out at the market
rates. It must take into account the actual cost
it would incur in managing, reconditioning and
preparing the property for marketing. It must also
consider the actual costs it would incur in selling
the property.
(R.65-66; T.4-6)
is purely speculative, constitutes a material issue of fact which
would preclude the lower Court granting Summary Judgment, if not
sufficient to bar the action.

(See Lockhart v. Equitable Realty

(supra 1336)
In order
"One-Action

for Respondent

Rule"

to escape

the provisions of the

it must prove by a preponderance

that

the

security was lost or disposed of without any fault or blame or
conduct on its part.
P.2d 43 (Ut. 1980)

Utah Mortgage & Loan Company v. Black, 618
The Utah Supreme Court in Black reversed the

granting of a Summary Judgment by the lower District Court on the
basis

that

"One-Action
Section

the allegation Plaintiff's action was barred by the
Rule," where

78-37-1,

U.C.A.

Plaintiff
was

failed

a disputed

to proceed
question

of

under
fact,

necessitating

that the Summary Judgment be vacated and the case

remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent
with the Court's opinion.

At page 45, the Court said:

"However, if the security is lost or disposed of
because of any failure or neglect of the creditor, he
deprives himself both of the right to foreclose on the
security and to seek a deficiency from the debtor,
(citation)
The lower Court's ruling that Defendant did not file an
Affidavit controverting the Affidavit of Kathleen Hackett and her
reliance

on

allegations

and

denials

in her

pleadings

was

insufficient to show there is an issue of fact is misplaced.
(R. 19)

In Lockhart

v. Equitable

Realty

(supra), this Court

stated at page 1335:
In the instant case, Defendant's affirmative defense
and Motion to Dismiss based upon Lockhart's failure
to comply with the provisions of U.C.A. 1953,
78-37-1, precludes the granting of Summary Judgment
in favor of Lockhart. . . .
it was, therefore,
unnecessary for Defendants to submit opposing
Affidavits as to the issue in order to comply with
Rule 56(e) supra, because the issue was sufficiently
raised in their Answer and Motion to Dismiss and was
uncontroverted by Lockhart's Affidavits.
Respondent,

in

its Memorandum

in support

Summary Judgment, (Argument I) recognized

of

the Motion

for

the applicability

of

the "One-Action Rule," but claimed it came within the exception.
(R. 29-30)

Appellant filed

her Motion

to Dismiss

Respondent's failure to comply with 78-37-1.
for Summary

Judgment,

upon

Granting the Motion

in part, that Appellant

controverting Affidavits was error.

based

did

not

file

The value of Respondent's security interest was lost due to
its failure and neglect to take timely action to cure the default
and avoid foreclosure of the senior lien.

Respondent's failure

to exhaust its security interest as required by law, primarily on
the basis of its unilateral, speculative decision, "that it did
not believe there was economic justification for doing so," does
not meet the test of the exception to the "One-Action Rule,"
to-wit: the security has been lost without Respondent's fault or
negligence.

This critical

Equitable Realty

issue was addressed

in Lockhart v.

(supra):

In accordance with precedent and clear intent of
the statute (78-31-1) we hold that it is not
enough to speculate that the security is valueless
or might become valueless if foreclosed by the
senior lien holder,. Rather, the security must be,
in fact, exhausted and a deficiency established to
a certainty in order for the exception to apply.
We further rely upon Zions Savings Bank & Trust
Company v. Rouse, where this Court held: Even
where at the time of the giving of the mortgage
there were mortgages prior to the Plaintiff's
mortgage of such amounts as to take up the entire
value of the property, the Plaintiff was still
compelled to foreclose his subsequent mortgage and
come against the general assets of the Defendant
only by way of a deficiency judgment, (emphasis added)
The lower Court granting Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment
on the basis

that

there was a senior

lien foreclosure of the

property on June 22, 1987; and that Plaintiff did not bid at the
sale

because

it

believed

that

there

was

not

economic

justification for doing so; and after sale there was no property
to foreclose on; and the Plaintiff was not required to go through
a

fruitless

procedure, was

error

and

contrary

to

law.

The

evidence and

facts in this case clearly establish

security was not valueless.
exhaust

its security

certainty.

Lockhart

Respondent

Respondent's

intentionally failed to

and establish a deficiency, if any, to a
v. Equitable

Realty,

Inc.

(supra) Mere

speculation that the security is insufficient or may become such,
will not suffice to relieve Respondent of its obligation.
matter of law, Respondent, having failed to comply with

As a
U.C.A.

78-37-1, should be precluded from pursuing its action on the Note
against Appellant.
lower Court

The granting of the Summary Judgment by the

should

be reversed.

The Motion

of Appellant to

dismiss the action of Respondent should be granted.
POINT II
RESPONDENT

IS BARRED

BY BOTH

78-37-1 AND 57-1-32, U.C.A.

FROM PURSUING ITS CLAIMED DEFICIENCY AGAINST APPELLANT,
As stated, the action of Respondent against Appellant, in
substance, seeks a deficiency judgment without foreclosure of its
Second

Trust

undisputed

Deed

facts

in compliance
establish

with

78-37-1

Respondent's security

substantial value at the time of foreclosure
senior

lien holder, Prudential.

and

U.C.A.

The

interest had
sale by

the

Respondent took no action to

protect its security interest, did not exhaust the security and
allowed it to be lost.

These facts, which closely parallel those

in Lockhart (supra), clearly establish the applicability of
78-37-1 U.C.A. "One-Action Rule" in this case.

Respondent cannot

escape its statutory and legal responsibility by a decision based
on speculation, "that there was not economic justification
doing

so."

requires

(R. 21)

the

Utah

creditor

case

for

law clearly and unequivocably

(Respondent

here)

to comply

with

the

statute (78-3 7-1) and exhaust the security before proceeding with
an action
Realty
Bank

on the Note

Company,

Inc.

for deficiency.

(supra); Utah Mortgage v. Black

of Ephraim v. Davis

(supra).

Lockhart v. Equitable
(supra);

(supra); First National Bank v. Boley

The failure to comply with the "One-Action Rule," as in

this case, is a bar

to the action

of Respondent

which would

preclude recovery of any deficiency against Appellant.
Respondent makes reference to Utah Code Annotated 57-1-32 in
its Memorandum

in support

of Plaintiff's Motion

for

Summary

Judgment as a basis for award of attorney's fees and costs in a
deficiency action.

(R. 29)

Had Respondent proceeded

properly,

which it should have done in this case, and cured the default of
the senior lien owing to Prudential, and pursued

foreclosure of

its Trust Deed in compliance with the Utah Trust Deed Act,
(57-1-19

to

entitled

to a Deficiency

facts.

57-1-36

U.C.A.)

Respondent

Judgment

would

not

in view of the

have

been

undisputed

57-1-32 U.C.A. provides:
At any time within three (3) months after any
sale of property under a Trust Deed, as hereinabove
provided, an action may be commenced to recover the
balance due upon the obligation for which the Trust
Deed was given as security, and in such action the
Complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the
indebtedness which was secured by such Trust Deed,
the amount for which such property was sold, and

the fair market value thereof at the date of sale.
Before rendering judgment, the Court shall find
fair market value at the date of sale of the property
sold. The Court may not render judgment for more
than the" amount by which tfte amount ot indebtedness
with interest, costs and expenses of sale, including
Trustees and attorney's fees, exceeds the fair'
market value of the property as of the date of the
sale. (emphasis added)
The appraisal obtained by Respondent in January, 1987 established
the market value of the subject property to be $70,250.00.
amounts

owing

to

the

senior

lien

holder, Prudential, and

Respondent was less than $68,000.00 at the time of
and sale of the subject property.

The

foreclosure

The market value being greater

than the amount of the indebtedness, a deficiency judgment could
not be rendered against Appellant under the provisions of 57-1-32
U.C.A. cited above.
The action
Promissory

brought by Respondent against Appellant on the

Note alleges two

(2) causes of

contract and unjust enrichment.

(R. 1-6)

action, breach of
The remedy provided

for by 78-37-1 U.C.A. is exclusive and precludes an action
breach of contract.
1156 (1917)

for

Coburn v. Bartholowmew, 50 Ut. 566, 167 P.

Respondent cannot escape compliance with U.C.A.

78-37-1 or 57-1-32

by bringing

an action

based

on breach of

contract or for unjust enrichment, in that the "One-Action Rule"
is directly
right

contrary

to common

to waive the security

and

Jarman , 61 Ut . 125, 211 P. 962
Respondent

for breach

law by which a creditor had a
bring such action.
(1922)

of contract

Smith v.

The action brought by

is an apparent

attempt to

circumvent its statutorily imposed requirement to comply with the
"One-Action Rule."

In view of the undisputed

cited

the

sections

of

Utah

Code, and

facts, the

applicable

case

above
law,

Respondent is barred from pursuing the claimed deficiency against
Appellant.
POINT III
AWARD

OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS BY THE LOWER COURT WAS

NOT PROPER.
On the basis

that

the granting

of the Motion for Summary

Judgment by the lower Court was error and the action brought is
barred by the "One-Action Rule," Respondent is not entitled to be
awarded attorney's fees and costs.
However, should this Court uphold the lower Court's granting
of the Summary Judgment, the award of attorney's fees and costs
should be vacated
the hours

claimed

in that the Respondent did not establish that
to have

been

expended

in this

case

were

reasonable and necessary in light of the nature of this case and
the difficulty; or that the rate charged was the rate commonly
charged

for

this

type of action in the community.

Trayner v.

Cushing, 688 P.2d 856 (Ut. 1984).
Respondent

filed

a Motion for Determination of Attorney's

Fees supported by Affidavit.

(R.84-92)

A Memorandum of Costs

required by Rule 54(d)(2) U.R.C.P. was not filed or submitted to
the lower Court.

Costs were merely

included

as a part

of

the

Motion for Attorney's Fees.

Appellant objected to the Affidavit

for Attorney's Fees and Request for Costs on the basis that the
Affidavit did not meet the test of Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578
P.2d

520

(Ut.)

requirements

and

the Request

of Rule 54(d)(2).

for Costs

did

not meet

Reference was also made to an

article in the Utah Law Review No. 3, 1984, page 533.
Over

the

(T.3-7)

the objection of Appellant, the Court allowed counsel for

Respondent to give testimony in an effort to cure the defective
Affidavit.

(T.9)

Even with instructional help from the Court,

counsel for Respondent failed to adequately establish the factors
necessary for the award of attorney's fees other than his mere
belief that the rate he charged was reasonable.
testified

that the rate charged

was set by his

Mr. Lundberg
firm for all

clientele without regard to specific matters. (T.10)

The award

of attorney's fees and costs was included in the Summary Judgment
without preparation of Findings.
622

(Ut. 1985)

Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694, P.2d

The award of attorney's fees and

costs by

the

lower Court based on defective Affidavit, insufficient testimony
and failure to file the required Memorandum
proper and abuse of discretion.

of Costs was

not

The award of attorney's fees and

costs should be vacated.

CONCLDSION
Appellant's Memorandum

in Opposition to Motion for Summary

Judgment and Motion to Dismiss action of Respondent for failure

to

comply

with

78-37-1,

"One-Action

Rule" raise

sufficient

material issues of fact which precluded the lower Court granting
Summary Judgment.

Respondent's noncompliance was uncontroverted

other than to claim that the security was lost through no fault
of its own and came within the exception to the "One-Action Rule"
which

is

a material

preponderance.

factual

dispute

Respondent failed

facts clearly established

to

be

proved

by

in its burden of proof.

the security was lost and

a
The

Respondent

was at "fault."
Respondent

cannot

escape

its statutorily

imposed duty to

first exhaust the security before proceeding with an action

on

the Note by mere speculation, "that in its opinion there was not
economic justification for doing so."
so would

render

meaningless.

the statute

Respondent,

obligation, should

not

To allow Respondent to do

(78-37-1) and

in the hope
be allowed

existing

it can avoid

to stand

case law
its

legal

idle, allow

the

security with established value to be lost by the foreclosure of
the senior lien holder, and then bring action on the Note for its
claimed deficiency.

The Summary Judgment should be reversed and

Appellant's Motion to Dismiss the action of Respondent granted as
a matter of law.
Respectfully submitted,

K

KPMXlM H. FAftfcHMJSER '
A t t o r n e y for D e f e n d a n t / A p p e l l a n t

DELIVERY CERTIFICATE

I certify four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing
was

hand

delivered

to J. Scott

Lundberg, Attorney

for

Plaintiff/Respondent, 175 East Fourth South, Suite 900, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111 on this

fyd@

day of April, 1989.

APPENDIX A

Please return Documents to Vera Peters

1865 Wasatch Drive

SLC

84108

THIS iS A EGALLf B1ND1NG CCNTPACT IF NOT UNDERSTOOD SEE< COMPETENT AQVICE

UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
3672262
——
6 t h
1 THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this
day of. M a y
by and between VERA C. HESS PETERS, formerly Vera C. Hess, a woman,

hereinafter designated as the Seller, and

, A D , 19

ROBIN J . ERICKSON,—a woman,

hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of S a l t Lake C i t y . S a l t Lake C o u n t y , S t a t e of Utah
2. WITNESSETH That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer,
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, situate in
the county of
S a l t Lake
, state of Utah, to-wit 1245 East S i e s t a D r . , Sandy, Utah
ADDRESS

More particularly described as follows*

Unit A, SIESTA DRIVE CONDOMINIUM, as the same is identified in the plat recorded
in Book 78 at Page 244 and in the Enabling Declaration of Condominium recorded in
Book 4729 at Page 1279 as Entry No. 31596369, of official records.
Together witha 50% ownership interest in common and limited common areas and facilities, as described in plat and enabling declaration. Together with a right and
easement of use and enjoyment in and to the common areas as described in and provided for in said enabling declaration of condominium.
Together with one-half interest in ownership of swimming pool, (see below)**
3. Paid Dujei heicbj agieej tu entei nitu pujJUJiun und paj fin jaid ducubml pieuiijui the sum uf
"
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(See Exhibit "A" attached hereto and by reference made a part hereof)

** Together with all window coverings, all light fixtures, gas log, all carpeting
and oven.

Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the

8th

d a v 0f

May

t

1ft o*- .

4. Said monthly payment* are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction ot the
principal Interest shall be charged from
May 8.,—1981
_,.,
on all unpaid portions of the
purchase price at the rate of s e e Ex. "A" gey^jg^xXXXXXXXX^p^Xj^gfy T h e B u y e r > a t h l s o p t l o n a t a n y t i m e ,
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is made.
5 It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than according
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller
6. It is understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in favor of ( 1 ) P r u d e n t i a l
Federal Savings (2) City Consumer S e r v i c e s , I n c .
^ h a n unpaid balance of
j (1) 5 4 , 3 5 3 . 7 0 (2) 18,761 a s o f (1) May 1, 1981 (2) May 5, 1981
7 Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said premises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said property, except the following
no e x c e p t i o n s
8. The Salle* la giweai the option te •nawra, aaaaata and maintain laana toeiuad by gaid paapeaty ef net to oiieood the
H—« tiwpairf *mm*va*t

hwlaw
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t : _ _ — " H pei annum ami payable m regular monthly installments, ppewded- that the agpcgatc monthly installment
paymante peajmaad te be made ay Sollee en aaid laana a ball net ha gaaatcp thaw g»«h installment payment requited to be
made by the Bayoa andea tkta aantaaeti Whan the ppiaeipal due hepeandep has bean pedueed ta the amount uf unj jueh
^ M and maptgagea the Belle* agpeea te-convey and the Buyep agpeoa la aaeapt title to the abo»e deexpibtd property
subject te said loans and mortgages.
9 It lll« Buytfl IJPSIIPJ lu eAEiuji liu iig.lit tlimu&h uimeleiated paymawtn nniiea thia agaaemant ta pay off any obli.
•gat*ana outstanding at data af thia agaeomant against aaid property, it ahall ha tha Buyaa'a ohligatien ta aaaarae awd
pay any penalty urhitib may ba aequiiied oa .prapayaaant of eaid prion ohliffntiona. Prepayment panaltiaa m aaapaet
to obniauuwu against said ppepepty inenwu* by oeHePi aftop data ef thia agaaamanti ohall be paid ay- aellep unions
said obligations ape aeaamed a» appaewad by buyagi
10 Tlie Duyn a g i i u upon wi'itten gequeat af the Belaep ta mail a appliaatian ta a tellable lanrioa iea a lean ef iiwh
amount as eawbe seeuped uwdep the
pcgulatiena «i aaid lawdaa and haaohy najnaaa te apply any amount aa renewed upon
the pwpahaea ppiee abawa mantunea1, and ta awaaata tka papepa ^e^Ml»ed and pay ana hatf the —ipanaaa aaaaaety in eb
taming aaid leemi the fiallaa agaaaiwg ta pay the atkaa awa halfi paemdad hnniave*i that the mantbly paywaaata and
mtapaat aata paa.wiaadt a ball net awaaad. the aaaaitkiy payaaanta and intaaeat aat» aa aatlmed nbavai

11. The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed
and which may become due on these premises during the life of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following
no exceptions
The Seller further covenants and agrees that he will not default in the Davment of hia oblurmtiona irain«t «»iH nM «~.+»

EXHIBIT "A"

ATTACHED TO AND BY REFERENCE MADE A PART OF THAT CERTAIN UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT DATED MAY 6, 1981, BY AND BETWEEN VERA C. HESS PETERS, formerly Vera C.
Hess, a woman, as Seller, and ROBIN J. ERICKSON, a woman, as Buyer.

3.

Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described

premises, the sum of EIGHTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AND NO/100 DOLLARS C$84,500),
payable at the office of Seller, her assigns or oraer, said sales price to be paid
as follows:

$54,353.70 represented by a Trust Deed in favor of Prudential Service

Corporation, dated June 18, 1979, recorded June 18, 1979 in Book 4882, Page 1260
as Entry No. 3296175, of official records, payable at the rate of $601.00 per month
and bearing interest at

the rate of

11.25Z per annum.

Buyer agrees to make all

future payments, commencing June 1, 1981, on said Trust Deed obligation (Loan No.
001-047713-3).

It is understood and agreed that said monthly payments shall include

the payment of general property taxes and hazard insurance premiums (insurance on
structure only) and if said taxes and insurance premiums increase, the monthly payment due Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association shall increase accordingly;
$18,761.00 represented by an obligation due to City Consumer Services, Inc., dated
April 3C, 1981, payable at the idle of $293.23 per month and bearxn^ xui.eie&l at
the rate of 16.50% per annum.

Buyer agrees to make all future payments, commencing

June 5, 1981 on feaid obligation, it being understood and agreed (by the terms of
Disclosure Statement, Promissory Note and Closing Statement - a copy of which has
been given to Buyer concurrently with the signing of this contract) that this obligation may be paid in full at

any time without penalty.

Seller's equity, in the

amount of 11,385,30 shall be paid in full (with the exception of $100.00 principal),
on or before November 1, 1981.

No interest will be charged on Seller's equity if

paid on or before August 1, 1981 and at the rate of 15% percent from May 8, 1981
if not paid on or before that date and at 18% if paid at anytime after due date
of November 1, 1981.

Buyer agrees to pay any late charge assessments on any of

the loans hereinabove set forth.

The balance of beller's equity ($lu0.00) shall

be paid by Buyer at time of assumption of the loan first above described or upon
o»
refinancing the subject property.
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